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Abstract: The article aims to discuss the relative absence of references to the concept of psychotic desire in the 
Lacanian community. This discussion is relevant because Lacan did not exclude desire and psychosis of his conception 
of analytic treatment. This research makes a review of the references to psychotic desire in Lacan’s work and its clinical 
application (Schreber case). The conclusion is that the problem is not a lack of desire, but rather its support. This 
article proposes differential forms of psychotic desire associated with subjective positions whose demarcation is 
important for the cure.
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Introduction 
This article aims to discuss the relative lack of 
references to the concept of desire in the transmission 
of cases of psychosis within the analytic community that 
found an orientation in Lacan’s work. It is frequent that in 
the transmission of the approach of this type of cases there 
is no resort to the concept of desire, emphasizing rather 
the consequences of the lack of such (De Battista, 2012; 
Leibson & Lutzky, 2013). For example, in two of the latest 
publications compiled by JA Miller that compose more 
than twenty cases of psychosis treated by Lacan analysts – 
whose impact is relevant considering the importance of its 
compiler in the transmission of the lacanian psychoanalysis 
in Latin America – the concept of desire is not used to 
think about the processes of cure and, when mentioned, 
it is used to emphasize its inactivity (Cf. Borie, 2011; 
Dewambrechies-La Sagna, 2011; Di Ciaccia, 2011; Klotz, 
2012, Magnin, 2012; Zerghem, 2011). 
In the argumentation of these presentations, 
this inactivity of desire would go hand in hand with an 
intrusive and invasive phenomenon that would satisfy a 
delocalized jouissance whose relief would depend on its 
fixation through identification, delusional metaphors or 
writing practices, introducing a limitation of jouissance 
(Miller, 2011a, 2012; Soria Dafunchio, 2008). Other authors 
claim that desire would not be missing in psychosis (Soler, 
2009), but rather would be restricted to paranoia, declaring 
its abolition in schizophrenia (Quinet, 2016). However, 
even in these cases when psychotic desire is considered, 
the affirmation of its existence does not go hand in hand 
with a clarification of its operation in the cure. It refers 
again to the idea that an invasion of jouissance has to be 
limited. (Miller, 2011a, 2012; Soler, 1988; Quinet, 2016; 
Soria Dafunchio, 2008). In the same way, one can recalled 
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from the psychoanalytic comments of Joyce’s case, that 
emphasis rests on his practice of writing as a symptomatic 
solution and not on the desire to be an artist, which Lacan 
emphasized. 
  This absence of references (or this presence that 
radically affirms the inactivity of desire in psychosis) is 
striking, given that Lacan’s work has claimed the study 
of psychosis from a perspective that is not loss-making, 
and revalorized the function of the subjective position in 
these types of presentations that used to be relegated to the 
psychiatric approach. However, the inscription of psychoses 
inside the possible subjective positions of being in language 
did not guarantee, as we have pointed out, that this clinical 
experience was thought to be oriented by desire. 
This absence becomes even more symptomatic if 
we recover Lacan’s proposal (1964/1966) regarding the 
desire of the analyst, a last resource that would explain 
the effectiveness of the analysis. Lacan’s position on the 
analytical approach of the psychosis has encouraged his 
disciples to not recoil in the face of psychosis and he tried 
to found bases for a treatment beyond the psychiatric 
position (Lacan, 1967, 1977). 
We are faced with the paradox that while the 
concept of desire occupies an essential place in Lacan’s 
work – it is possible to say that it is a fundamental concept 
–, it is mostly not used in the reading on psychoses. In 
fact, one kind of transmission has generated the equation: 
foreclosure of the ‘Name-of-the-Father’ = lack of desire, 
and from there it is affirmed that there would be no desire 
in psychosis. But would this statement not contradict 
the ethics of psychoanalysis, which is precisely based on the 
function of the analyst’s desire? One of two alternatives: the 
approach of psychosis is outside psychoanalysis, relegated 
to therapy1, or if it does hold true that there is an analytical 
listener of psychoses then it is necessary to rethink the 
1 It seems to be the position of Miller (2011b, p. 75).
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question of desire. Here is the problem that we will try to 
address.
The discussion is topical because approximately 
after the 80’s it is possible to detect a change in the attitude of 
lacanian analysts concerning psychoses (De Battista, 2012). 
Nowadays these analysts have ventured much more into the 
treatment of psychosis and have given place to a series of 
formulations about the direction towards a cure: limitation 
of jouissance, ideal support, identifications, nomination, 
analyst sinthome, analyst support, accompanying analyst 
(Caroz, 2009; Laurent, 2002; Maleval, 2000; Miller, 1997, 
2005, 2009, 2011; Soler, 1988) which seem to be in conflict 
with a practice that is oriented by desire and good talking.
Freud and Lacan did not consider desire to be 
exclusive property of the neurotics. However the condition 
of psychotic desire has been less explored and even often 
overshadowed by the “invasion of jouissance”, which is 
considered a characteristic of psychosis (Maleval, 2000; 
Miller, 2011a, 2012; Quinet, 2016; Soria Dafunchio, 2008). 
This conception instead makes the psychotic the object 
of jouissance of the Other and hinders the possibility of 
thinking about the subjective participation in what he 
suffers. 
In this field of problems, this article methodologically 
proposes to recover Lacan’s formulations in the first place, 
with reference to desire in psychoses, in an attempt to 
point out that the exclusion of it in the conceptualization 
of psychosis was not developed in Lacan’s work, but rather 
later in the reception that his disciples made of his ideas 
(De Battista, 2015). In the second place, and following the 
method proposed by Lacan to return to Freud, the article 
advances in a new reading of the Schreber case from the 
operator of reading desire, which is not greatly explored 
among the comments that have privileged the facets related 
to the mechanism and the pathological process.2 (Leibson 
& Lutzky, 2013; Miller, 2011a, 2012; Soria Dafunchio, 
2008).
Finally, the concepts extracted from this case in 
the transmission of psychoanalysis of psychoses will be 
tested in the reading of clinical cases at the practices, 
which is an attempt to measure the heuristic value of the 
reintroduction of the concept of desire in the analytical 
listening of psychoses. From this analysis, there are three 
possible forms of desire in the psychoses which we propose 
to distinguish in which pure forms and impure forms are 
extracted in the results, with not only the delusional forms 
being included among them.
2 It is interesting how the construction of the cases that are transmitted 
abound in clinical details about the triggering and the different phenome-
na that arise at that moment, understood the consequences of the opera-
tion of foreclosure. This detailed description of the trigger – pathological 
process for Freud - contrasts with extensive periods in which the same 
patients were stabilized and inserted into social bonds, which neverthe-
less in the construction of the case they are subsumed in minimum sen-
tences of the type “Stable twenty years”, without providing more precise 
references to the modalities in which that patient was sustained for so 
long. Examples for these cases are presented by JD Matet y M. Bassols 
(Miller, 2011a). 
Desire and psychosis in Lacan’s work 
A genealogical study could be carried out to trace 
how this exclusion of the concept of desire to think how 
these psychoses became part of the thinking of Lacan’s 
disciples. This topic itself requires an investigation that 
goes beyond the limits of this article.3 However, we can 
locate some landmarks. For example, the affirmative 
answer given by Lacan to J-A Miller in 1977 to the question 
by the later regarding if the mathemes – divided subject, 
object, S1, S2 – could be used to think about the psychoses. 
Remember that the divided subject represents Lacan’s the 
subject of desire. Twenty years later, Miller (1997) asks 
about desire in psychoses and asserts that the metonymy 
of the forclusive defect shouldn’t be the word “desire” but 
the word “desert” (p.282). Soon after we see how this thesis 
has proliferated: Maleval (1997) affirms that paraphrenia – 
the most successful form of auto- therapeutic construction 
in psychosis for this author – leads to a renunciation of 
desire. In 2011, the impact of this assertion still persists 
and JD Matet (2011) uses the reference from 1997 that 
he first mentioned to propose that the case presented is 
a “desertified world” (p. 83). That year Miller returns to 
that question made in 1977 about the subject divided in the 
psychosis and maintains that “the question is not solved” 
(Miller, 2011b, p. 237) 
We believe that there would be a previous step to 
the study of this reception of the concept, which we intend 
to address in this study. We also intend to demonstrate that 
the concept of desire – as the essential dimension of human 
being – is not absent in the way that Lacan approaches the 
psychoses and even that its reintroduction would allow 
another reading of this clinic, aiming not only to sustain 
its inherent position in relation to the human but also to 
provide resources for the cure. 
The notion of limitation of jouissance is that which 
is most frequently used for the treatment of psychoses 
among the disciples of Lacan (Laurent, 2002; Maleval, 
2000; Miller, 2011a, 2012; Soler, 1988; Soria Dafunchio, 
2008). But not by chance, one of Lacan’s definitions of 
desire is that desire is the defense of exceeding a limit in 
jouissance (Lacan, 1960/1966). Why think about cases 
in terms of limitation of jouissance and not make questions 
relating to the position of the psychotic in desire? We 
believe that deepening the concept of desire in the case of 
psychosis becomes crucial for treatment that is based on 
the principles of psychoanalysis, according to an ethic of 
desire and  “well-speaking” (bien dire).
In one way, to exclude desire from the human 
dimension responds to an Aristotelian ethic that Lacan 
3 This study corresponds to ongoing research that starts from the role of 
Freud’s interlocutors in the construction of an analytical theory of psy-
chosis, especially considering the role played by the paranoid Fliess and 
the transfer plot that is generated between this one, Freud, Jung, Ferenczi 
and Abraham. We understand that this initial formulation then impacted 
on the analytical conceptions of the psychoses derived from it (De Battis-
ta, 2015). This research has been funded in part by the Consejo Nacional 
de Investigaciones Científicas y técnicas (CONICET). 
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(1986) put on the side of the discourse of the Master. At 
the same time that Aristotle excludes the desire of the 
human, he relates it to the lack of reason and bestiality. 
For the purposes of our subject, the fact that desire is 
not compatible with reason brings it closer to madness. 
This ethics of the domain seem to be what, on the other 
hand, we find in the attempts to treat psychoses that are 
oriented to limiting jouissance. However, the Lacanian 
perspective reintroduces the question of desire as the 
basis of analytic experience and, following Spinoza, 
gives status to the essence of the human being. The 
difference between the Aristotelian ethics and the ethics 
of psychoanalysis proposed by Lacan is at the center of 
the question about desire, and this does not exclude the 
case of psychosis. 
Although Lacan did not exclude the psychotic from 
this condition of desire that is essential to human beings, he 
did not greatly advance about how the desire would operate 
in the cure of the psychotic in the elucidation, which is a 
fundamental part of the transference in the analytic device. 
We will advance our hypothesis in this respect in the 
conclusions. However, the aim of this article is to recover 
the concept of desire to think about the clinic of psychosis, 
leaving aside in the second place its link with the transfer 
and desire of the analyst.
It can be read in several sections of Lacan’s work 
that psychosis is not far from desire, especially in what is 
known as his first teaching. Now, the profusion of initial 
references is diminishing throughout his teaching and it 
seems that at the end of the study the concept of desire 
does not have the same importance as at the beginning. 
Lacan’s late formulation would seem to refute this idea. 
In 1980, shortly before his death, Lacan claims that he 
never set out to overtake Freud, but to continue his work, 
emphasizing that he dedicated himself to putting in form 
the tie of the fixation of desire with the mechanisms of the 
unconscious. Then he clarifies: “Desires, destiny of the 
drives – as I translate Triebschick-sale” (Lacan, 1980, p. 
20). It might be thought, based on the introduction of the 
object a in the theory, that the concept of desire can be 
read in its appearance of objectified cause and therefore 
its place is central in the theory of knots, considering that 
the knot grips the object in its cross-linking. We have 
already mentioned the importance of desire in Joyce’s 
symptomatic solution, which would lead us to a nodal 
conception of desire.
With that reservation, let us turn to Lacan’s 
formulations for desire in psychoses. In his On a question 
preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis, written 
in 1958, Lacan underlines that in the absence of the Name-
of-the-Father, Schreber has assumed the desire of the 
mother through some identifications. In fact, Schreber’s 
solution includes the dimension of lacking, of a being that 
is missing: in the absence to be the phallus that is missing 
to the mother, will be the woman who is missing to God. 
The dimension of lacking is attaching to desire according 
to Lacan. 
Lacan (1998) does not abolish the dimension of the 
mother’s desire in psychoses and specifies in the seminar 
about the formations of the unconscious that it is not an 
absence of desire of the mother that is covered in psychosis, 
but rather the desire that has not been symbolized, desire at 
last. It is the reference that desire can find in the signifier 
of the lack, the phallus, which is in question, but not the 
existence of desire. 
Then the question would not be about the absence 
of desire in psychosis but rather about the presence of a 
desire that is not symbolized by the Name-of-the-Father, 
that is to say: a desire that is not tied to the law of the father, 
a dimension that characterizes the position of the psychotic 
while rejecting the paternal imposture (Lacan, 1958/1966a). 
In 1958, Lacan insists upon the psychotic effort to 
institute a desire in the Other, and this allows him to reread 
the grammatical deductions of the paranoid delusions made 
by Freud: the other who took the initiative to love, is read by 
Lacan in terms of psychotic attempts to institute a desire in 
the Other (Lacan, 1998). Then, desire is not symbolized by 
the law of the father; it is an attempt to institute a desire in 
the Other, appearing as the first characteristics of psychotic 
desire, as is pointed out by Lacan. 
Later, in the seminar regarding identification, more 
precisely in the class of June 13, 1962, Lacan is explicit 
in saying that neurosis, psychosis and perversion are three 
faces of the normal structure of desire, and that each one is 
specified by the way that ignores one of the three terms that 
Lacan points out: body, Other, phallus; among which the 
fate of desire is played. He proposes that in the structuring 
of psychotic desire the body is all important, since the 
psychotic does not know the phallus nor the Other, and 
because of this condition, it has to deal with a unveiled 
body. This unfamiliarity about the Other goes hand in hand 
with an inability to grasp the desire of the Other, so we can 
identify the attempt to institute it through persecution. In 
this way, the relationship to the body in psychoses appears 
intimately linked to the position related to desire.
While recovering these references, we noticed that 
these formulations could give us the tools to think about 
the dynamic of the subjective positions in psychoses, 
which becomes something very important to understand 
the movements that the cure produces. The most deficient 
reading of these concepts guide us to think that the 
condition of the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father 
leads to an invariable structure, without the possibility of 
modification. We do not assert with this that which could 
occur a passage from a psychotic position to a neurotic 
position and that the cure would consist in “neurotizing” 
the psychotic.    
 According to Lacan, the fundamental meeting 
between the desire of the subject and the desire of the 
Other can depend on accidents, because of the way that 
the desire of the father and of the mother were presented 
for that subject. At this point, Lacan (2006) argues that 
there was no choice, because the choice was already 
made at the level of what was presented to the subject. 
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At this foundational meeting, the structural coordinates 
of the subjective position are defined. In this case, the 
foreclosure hypothesis seems to have produced a static 
effect in its appropriation: given the structure of the 
psychosis, there would be no possibility of change. This 
reading closes the door to any possible treatment, even 
when the question of the reversibility of foreclosure was a 
subject that concerned Lacan (École Freudienne de Paris, 
1976). 
The problem of the possible changes of position 
of the psychotic does not invalidate the fixity of the 
foundational coordinates, but it would be possible to think 
of a dynamic and of dialectic of the cure, in which we 
consider that desire would be a key element. But, before 
basing this hypothesis, we will continue to consider Lacan’s 
references to desire in psychosis.
Desire is established in the dialectic of lack where 
it is the Other who gives the experience of desire to the 
subject. This implies some dependence of the subject’s 
desire on the Other’s desire: the desire to be desired, desire 
for desire is the essential dimension (Lacan, 1986). This 
relationship between the subject’s desire with the Other’s 
desire is not a structure reserved only for neurosis. Lacan 
(2013) is clear at this point when he argues that it is an 
essential structure of any analytically defined structure 
and not just of the neurotic. 
Lacan does not renounce to situate the position of 
the desire in different structures, there would be different 
forms of desire and diverse forms of subject: “The paradox 
of desire is not the privilege of the neurotic, yet he is 
conscious of the existence of the paradox by his way of 
facing it” (Lacan, 1958/1966b, p. 637).
The position of the neurotic related to desire 
corresponds to the phantasie: the phantasie is the position 
of the neurotic in desire (Lacan, 1958/1966b). The position 
of how the psychotic related to desire corresponds to the 
body, as Lacan places in the seminar about identification. 
For the neurotic, whose position in desire is the 
phantasie? The metaphorical reference to the Name-of-
the-Father ties to the registers instituting an oedipal and 
consequently religious psychic reality. The object a, cause 
of desire, is apprehended by the knot. The desire is mediated 
by the phallic reference that gives it a common measure and 
symbolizes the X of the mother’s desire. The function of the 
father ties the desire to the law of the interdiction of incest: 
here is the père-version (Lacan, 1974-75). The X of desire 
is fixed on the phantasie that brings an interpretation. The 
neurotic subject has a phantasmatic relationship to desire, 
while desire is sustained by phantasie.  
The situation is different for the psychotic, because 
his condition implies the rejection of the metaphorical 
reference of the father, meaning the foreclosure of the 
Name-of-the-Father. But the absence of the metaphor does 
not predetermine the presence of desire, what supports 
it is the metonymy (Lacan, 1981a). Desire as a metonym 
of being in the subject (Lacan, 2013) is not necessarily 
maintained by the metaphorical operation or by the father. 
Lacan’s entire teaching goes in the direction of something 
beyond the father. 
Lacan (1958a) affirms that desire makes the 
law. Desire is presented as autonomous referring to the 
mediation of the law: “the law comes from desire” (Lacan, 
1960/1966, p. 814), an effect of transmission has reversed 
this assertion, concluding that it is the law of the father 
that introduces desire. Consequently it follows that if the 
psychotic rejects the Name-of-the-father, then desire is 
excluded. But Lacan does not make the Name-of-the-
Father or the law absolute conditions. Desire is the absolute 
condition. 
The question of desire is beyond the father; it 
concerns the condition of the speaking being in language 
and does not necessarily imply a metaphorical reference. 
Other names of the father may perform the function of 
tying the registers (Lacan, 1963/ 2005). By restoring the 
dimension of desire, the psychotic invents his own rule.
We propose that the problem is not the absence 
of desire in the psychotic, but rather how that desire is 
supported without reference to the father and without the 
phantasie. Freud detected this condition in Schreber’s case 
that induced him to modify his nosography: the difference 
of the transference neuroses, in which the tie among the 
objects inside unconscious phantasie remains, is that the 
psychotic discards them, and instead of an introversion 
of the libido in the phantasie, we find an inversion of 
the libido in the self (Freud, 1914/1976). Schreber does 
not defend himself from his phantasie of desire through 
repression and refuge in phantasie, but the initial rejection 
is followed by a work of reconstruction that leads him to a 
reconciliation with the desire he had to repress, the desire 
performs asymptotically in the delusion that it had rejected 
in the beginning (Freud, 1911/1976).
Lacan (1978) also pointed out a form of psychotic 
desire in the delusion of immortality of the ladies affected 
by Cotard’s syndrome and spoke about the realization of 
desire. He also placed the existence of an abolition of desire 
on the melancholy side of pain, an accomplished desire 
that confines with desire in its pure state: the desire to die 
(Lacan, 2013). 
However, this is not the only form of psychotic desire 
that Lacan places, he also spoke of the freezing of desire in 
paranoia (Lacan, 1974-75). This means that we can think 
about pure and impure forms of desire in psychosis, pure 
forms that come to death and to direct realization, by short 
circuits, and impure forms, masked, fixed which introduce 
a preamble to the realization (De Battista, 2012). 
Reading Lacan’s work produced a displacement of 
the question. We observe how the existence of desire in 
psychosis is not in question, although it opens the question 
about the type of support that could support it, considering 
desire’s evanescence. 
Based on this idea, it is possible to say that delusion 
can operate as support to desire, and we would find its mark 
in the asymptotic character that is sometimes presented. A 
writing practice can works as a support of desire, as in the 
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case of Joyce who maintained his existence in the desire to 
be an artist which would keep some college students busy 
for centuries. 
The discussion about the absence or presence of 
desire in psychosis transcends a purely academic question 
to have a significant impact on clinical practice. The 
clinical question that might come from this is in regards 
to being able to locate the position of the subject in desire. 
Is the psychotic at the point where he can desire? Has the 
psychotic found support for that desire?
We shall now return to Freud and the case that 
inaugurates analytical thinking about psychoses, namely 
Schreber’s case, which has become the model for thinking 
of the question of psychosis in the formation of many 
generations of analysts. We propose rereading it from the 
position of the psychotic in desire. If desire is an absolute 
condition and through which law originates, then it is in 
relation to the changes of position related to desire that can 
be thought in the lines of efficiency of a cure.    
Schreber’s positions about the desire 
Early on, Freud pointed out the difference between 
defending oneself from desires by repressing them and 
retaining a relationship with them in phantasie – the position 
of the neurotic –, and to carry out the desire in action even 
if that implies loss of identity and the transformation of 
the being into delusion, for example. In Schreber’s case, 
the unanswered question for Freud is precisely what leads 
the president to accept the desire he had to suppress, why 
instead of taking refuge in phantasie he takes refuge in 
psychosis (Freud, 1911/1976). 
In this case, Freud points to at least three different 
positions against unconscious desire. The first can be 
extracted from the reaction of revolt and radical rejection to 
the appearance of desire expressed in the dream “it would 
be nice to be a woman at the time of intercourse”. It would be 
nice, but it is not, this is a desire but not a real pleasure. The 
clinical correlate of this position of rejection is a discomfort 
that dissolves the body in mortifying or hypochondriac 
mortification, which is precipitated in several suicide 
attempts: Schreber believes he is dead. He does not want 
to live either. In this situation the Other is irrelevant, Freud 
(1914/1976) speaks about a libidinal detachment of objects, 
an inability of transference. The circuit seems to be closing 
in on the impulsive destiny of returning to the own person 
and the self-destructive consequences. The position of 
rejection of desire leads to mortification.  
The second position introduces that the initiative 
comes from the Other (Lacan, 1981a). Clinically this is 
manifested in the delusion of persecution or in erotomania: 
the body is submitted to be abused, the Other wants to 
murder the soul. Who desires is the other, not him. Freud 
emphasizes that the accusation of the souls’s killing 
indeed hides a self-accusation (or is it not himself who has 
“committed suicide” rejecting that desire connected him to 
the feeling of being alive?). The position of radical revolt is 
now modified and includes a detour. The body enters into 
the circuit of the Other. The initially rejected desire is now 
awarded to the Other who has taken the initiative to love 
and/or hurt him.
Freud (1921/1976) said that the persecuted does not 
project in the vacuum but is guided by the knowledge he has 
of his own unconscious, and what he finds in the Other has 
similarity with what he rejects of himself. It is the rejected 
desire that appears in the persecution. The persecuted, 
unlike the neurotic, knows the own unconsciousness and 
can translate it with severity. 
The second position is not compatible with repres-
sion, but seems to be consonant with the drive destiny of 
the disorder in the opposite: it is not me who desires, but the 
Other. Lacan (1998) reformulates this aspect saying that in 
the delusion of persecution there is the attempt to restore 
or institute a desire in the Other, since the psychotic does 
not have the symbolization of the desire of the mother that 
introduces the phallus through the operative of the Name-
of-the-Father. Desire is attributed to the Other, it is not he 
who thinks that it would be nice to be a woman in the act of 
intercourse, but the Other who wants to abuse him and take 
him as a “slut.” Understanding persecution in these terms 
would imply introducing its transferential dimension.
The third position we can extract from the 
Schreber’s case is that Freud names “reconciliation” or 
currency of the initially rejected unconscious desire. It 
corresponds clinically with the paraphrenic moment of 
delusion, the solution that brings the delusional metaphor 
“to be the woman of God”, returning to the jouissance into 
pleasure and fulfilling the desire that had appeared in the 
dream. It is an asymptotic fulfillment of desire that has 
found support in delusion, organizing the world and the 
being with some stability.
The difference between the first and second position 
is that revolt and rejection have been changed into consent, 
an assignment that entails a transformation of the being: 
the death of the old being and the advent of a new being 
who comes from his change into woman. This subversion 
requires such self-sacrifice. It is not about a possible short-
circuiting of action anymore, but of an action that has the 
value of an act, of a transformation of the subject. The 
dimension of the Other participates and is pluralized, but 
does not only concern the relationship to the persecutor, 
the love of his wife and the fact that he addresses us 
his testimony are part of it too (Lacan, 1958/1966a). A 
sublimatory aspect seems to be incorporated, because the 
publication of Memoirs of My Nervous Illness aims to be 
of social utility. The solution includes a relationship with 
the body that moves away from an initial hypochondriac 
mortification.  
 We have the position of rejection of desire and 
the consequent mortification of the body manifested 
in hypochondria and suicidal acts. The position of 
attempting to institute a desire in the Other by persecution 
or erotomania. And finally the implementation of desire 
continued in the asymptotic. 
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Three forms of desire in psychosis is not mediated 
by repression or phantasie. Three forms of desire whose 
relationship to action is more direct, , and the question about 
how to sustain a desire that is sometimes in a immediate 
relationship with action.
Clinical Consequences of Return to Desire 
Let us now turn to the clinical utility that these 
distinctions can bring. Locating the point where the subject 
is in a relationship to desire guides the cure and we believe 
that this is the meaning that can be given to the Lacan’s 
indication (1958/1966b) “desire holds the direction of 
analysis” (p. 636). The point is to know where the subject 
is with respect to desire. Is he at the point where he desires? 
(Lacan, 2013). 
In the first form, we point out that he is at the 
position of rejection or abolition of desire, whose clinical 
expression are the moments of melancholy and hypo-
chondriac mortification that are an invariant of all psy-
chosis and that in many cases appear in the form of the 
death of the subject. It is a desire in its pure state, in other 
words, a desire of death that is extinguished logically in its 
realization (Lacan, 1986). 
I propose thinking that the hypochondriac anguish 
and even some psychosomatic phenomena in psychosis 
have value as they indicate moments of rejection from 
unconscious desire in the treatment of jouissance, with its 
consequent mortification effects: the body appears in 
its real dimension, that for which the psychotic is normal 
in his desire but does not recognize in his structuring of the 
Other and the phallus (Lacan, 1981b). 
These episodes, sometimes confused with depres-
sion, point us to the presence of a desire that confines with 
death, they warn us about a limit in the jouissance that 
was exceeded; at the same time they retroactively indicate 
us to the nature of the previous support and the points in 
which it does not produce any effect. These moments are 
not analyzable, like anxiety; they imply a detachment of 
objects, a rejection of the Other. Desire in its pure and 
simple form leads one to the pain of existing in a pure state. 
The position of the psychotic in desire impacts the body.
The fact that this state of mortification is not 
constant requires thinking of other possible forms of 
desire, that are not so pure, but developed, even masked, 
not so close to the passage to the act. 
The second proposed form is one that tries to 
restore the dimension of desire in the Other by persecution 
or erotomania. It is also what Lacan calls “frozen desire” 
(Lacan, 1974-1975), which introduces some fixation 
and some support that we do not find in the first form. 
The solution by persecution allows moderating the 
hypochondriac anguish at the same time that the desiring 
circuit is open to the Other. Freud (1921/1976) points out 
that the rejection of the unconscious desire in the persecuted 
goes hand in hand with an hypercathexis of the slightest 
signs of the unconscious of the Other. They reject the Other, 
but in this same gesture they become extremely sensitive to 
the Other’s unconscious desire. The last resource of this 
that we propose to call “sensitivity to or avidity for desire”, 
Freud places it in an increased pretense of being loved. 
The supposed absence of desire in psychosis 
becomes a kind of avidity and an extreme sensitivity to the 
desire of the Other (De Battista, 2012). The psychotic tries 
to institute in the Other that experience of desire, which 
was not transmitted at the moment of his constitution. 
Persecution implies a transferential dimension where the 
key is the response of the Other to this attempt to institute 
a desire.
The third form that we delimit implies the problem 
of the support of desire in the psychoses. A desire that is 
much closer to realization, without the fixation given by 
the phantasie, it is also a desire adjacent to the short circuit 
– which introduces the extra difficulty regarding how to 
sustain it. 
Desire is the essential point where the subject’s 
being tries to assert itself; it is a support of existence (Lacan, 
2013). What would be the support after the renunciation of 
the phantasie support? The psychotic does not take refuge 
in phantasie, but is detached from the Other. Why should 
the psychotic resign himself to this narcissistic state and 
reconnect himself to the Other again? The issue is how 
social bonds are established in psychosis and what kind of 
ties there would be (Quinet, 2016). So what is at stake is 
being able to locate the subject’s position with respect to 
desire, the support of the one who sustains himself, the art 
of which each is capable.
From our experience, we have identified at least 
three possible forms of desire revealed in psychosis. 
The pure or simple forms of desire that are defined by a 
tendency to real-ization, that desire the impossible and for 
this reason are always on the edge of death, in confrontation 
with the real.
The realization in the strict sense of desire logically 
entails its abolition; therefore these are mortifying forms, 
close to the passage of the act, forms that we will call 
“antigonic”. We find the clinical expression of these forms 
in the melancholic and hypochondriac episodes that can 
occur in all kind of psychosis and that would indicate a 
difficulty to sustain desire, being submitted to a pure 
desire, potentiating the short circuit of death. In contrast 
the small rates of vitalization, the recovery of the feeling of 
life put us on the track of the desiring operation.
This realization of desire in its highest purity differs 
from other forms of desire, impure, frozen, sustained, for 
example, in the delusion. These forms of desire introduce 
us to what we will call “delusional realizations of desire”, 
which may charge an asymptotic bias, as is true in 
Schreber’s case, in which delusion works as support of 
desire and holds it in the infinitization of the asymptotic 
solution, constituting itself in the form of the originally 
rejected desire. 
The mortifying or antigonic forms of desire, which 
tend to its realization, are usually at the edge of the passage 
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of the act, are not very stable. The delusional forms of the 
realizations of desire introduce a more lasting support, but 
they seem to be accompanied by a fixation on the delusion 
that prevents the circulation by other social bonds.  
We find a third form of desire in psychosis, which 
is also impure, where it is sustained in the constitution of a 
certain social bond. In these forms, the introduction of the 
social would be talking about a sublimation quota that seems 
to differentiate the second form from the third. It includes 
what Freud placed as the creative capacity or artistic talent 
acting in sublimation. Joyce shows us that asymptotic 
support is not necessarily delusional: the sinthome “desire 
to be an artist” is also sustained in the asymptote and in the 
constitution of one Other who has need of the subject: “the 
writer who will maintain occupied the critics for centuries” 
(Lacan, 2005) or the woman who is missing to God, in the 
Schreber’s case (De Battista, 2012).  
In this sense there will be exceptional artistic 
talents, creators of genius. But also the most ordinary, 
usual, frequent art that comes to our doors asking to be 
recognized. This support of desire in the social bond does 
not always ask to be a persecutory or erotomaniacal turn, 
and on many occasions can be gestated in the analytic 
encounter and transferred later to other discourses, thereby 
enabling other circuits.
Then, I propose to test what was obtained from the 
reintroduction of the concept of desire in the analytical 
listening of psychoses by reading a clinical case.
Clinical case 
It is a patient around the age of 50, who has an 
emperor’s name and goes to therapy for sexual problems: 
relations with his wife are no longer satisfactory for him, he 
has started to avoid them, which is causing him a terrible 
discomfort and depression. He imposed some conditions 
on me: the meetings were not weekly but only every two 
months and I would have to listen to him. The intolerable 
point is located in certain practices that his wife has begun 
to ask him and that make him feel voided, because they 
make him feel like a slave in relation to her. 
“To be a slave of a woman” brings to him a latent 
Push-to-the-Woman, that in his adolescence took him to 
transvestite himself and get involved in practices with 
men that he found occasionally in the street. The patient 
associates this fact to the relationship he had with his 
mother, who forced him to do feminine jobs, a situation that 
he believes gave him certain characteristics of woman that 
have broken his personality. 
His mother was very possessive and capricious, he 
accuses her of having seduced him when he was a child and 
subsequently of having plotted to separate him from all the 
girlfriends he had. The father did not interfere, and, according 
to his mother, was not his real father. The patient interrupted 
all relations with his family during adolescence, nevertheless 
he feels that he continues under the injurious influence of his 
mother who had always destroyed his relationships. 
 “To be slave of a woman” is something that is 
updated not only with his wife, but also with others that 
are part of his environment: a neighbor, the daughter of 
a friend, his sister-in-law, friends of his wife, etc. They 
express their interest in him indirectly, and he realizes 
it by the way they look at him and by their attitudes: the 
neighbor waits for the bus while he walks, that means that 
she is in love with him. She makes a noise with the door 
when she leaves: she hopes to meet him. He comments that 
she has leaks in her apartment: therefore she is crazy with 
love for him. 
The small gestures of everyday life become signs 
that somebody took the initiative to love him. He does not 
know what to do with this very well: on the one hand he 
is attracted by the possibility of taking certain risks and 
responding to the initiative of these women, on the other 
hand in them he recognizes the characteristics that would 
bring him back to slavery. The same traits that he rejected 
in the mother are attractive to him now. 
At the same time he can place in the sessions that a 
relationship of slavery with a woman is unbearable because 
it pushes him to offer himself sexually to other men. He 
does not want to leave his wife, in whom he has found an 
exception to the “women who enslave” since for him she is 
a submissive and understanding woman who has accepted 
his request to not live with him in the same home, but to 
live in two different places: one on the first floor, the other 
on the third. 
The work on these coordinates took place in the 
interviews, within the framework of a submission to the 
impositions of this patient whose starting point was to 
accept his own conditions. It was also in the transference 
that he built a solution that is based on a certain “good 
distance” in his dealing with women. He began to write 
anonymous love letters to his neighbor. This allowed him, 
in his words, to fantasize that he yielded to temptation 
without exposing himself to the condition of slavery: “It is 
my unconscious self-preservation, I avoid her because she 
is crazily looking for the man who writes the letters. I look 
like Eva, I want to bite the apple of prohibition.” 
The patient maintained this practice of platonic 
love – as he called it – for one year and ended it when he 
thought he could be discovered as many women in the 
neighborhood were looking for the anonymous lover, the 
pseudonym which he used to sign the letters. During that 
time, he recovered the taste for sexuality with his wife and 
no longer felt depressed, but the fact of not being able to 
continue led him to a state of mortification made evident 
by his insomnia and the return of images and sounds linked 
to his first crisis. 
Thus, he implemented another practice that exploits 
the same efficiency lines as the first, but without its risks: 
maintains relationships with women in group phone 
sex. The possible encounter is always postponed to an 
indeterminate future.
These solutions were built in a situation in which 
he could speak freely of what he felt to be a symptom: his 
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relationship to women who enslave. Shaping the symptom 
led him to a dimension of “beyond” linked, in my opinion, 
to the possibility of positioning himself as desiring and the 
conflict that this situation involves, and to find other modes 
of support of desire more compatible with life in common.
Conclusions 
There are psychotic forms of desire that exist, 
whose difficulty would be in the way of tolerating it 
without reference to the Name-of-the-Father and the 
phantasie. Lacan proposes that the psychotic desire is 
a desire not symbolized by the paternal metaphor and 
therefore not referenced by the phallus. But this does not 
prevent thinking about a desire that is beyond the Father 
and that finds its reference in other names-of-the-Father. 
Desire as an absolute condition and, as in the origin 
of the law (Lacan, 1960/1966), would promote a reflection 
about sustaining a desire without the metaphorical reference 
of the father. Our patient appeals to an asymptotic support 
of desire that we can also read in the delusion of Schreber 
or in the Joycean desire that being an artist would keep the 
university students busy for centuries.
The psychotic could stay in the circuit of the 
previous Other (Lacan, 1960/1966), the Other enslaving, 
or make another choice. That would not change the first 
choice, the forced choice, but rather it would allow thinking 
about a modalization of the rejection or a modification of 
the position. In this way, the reintroduction of the concept 
of desire to think about the clinic of psychosis is not only 
a proposal linked to claiming the importance of desire in 
the constitution of the human, but it also opens the door to 
thinking about the role of desire as an operator in the device: 
if there are forms of psychotic desire, then psychotics can 
take benefits from the encounter with the analyst’s desire. 
It remains to elucidate the possible dynamics of this 
encounter.
The main subject is: What does the psychotic 
find? Indifference? Rejection? Fear? Anguish? An ideal? 
Fascination or admiration? The outcome of this meeting 
seems to depend on the answer to this question. And it 
is at this point that we understand that psychoanalyzed 
person has an advantage over other possible interlocutors. 
The position he may have reached soon after the treatment 
leaves him close to being a partner to the psychotic 
measure. If the encounter occurs, and if the psychotic 
consent to enter in a new circuit. The psychotic can remain 
in the alienating circuit of the previous Other – that one 
of the non-symbolized and devouring desire that he has 
rejected because of the imposture of a father who intended 
to regulate it –, but there is also the possibility to activate 
new circuits from the encounter with a special desire, the 
desire of the analyst. 
That way the analyst becomes a perfect partner: 
someone who can respond leaving out anguish and fear. 
Someone who can respond from the desire to sustain a 
desire. In the small speech to psychiatrists of Sainte Anne, 
Lacan (1967) points out the importance of the anguish that 
the encounter with the psychotic produces, as well as the 
response of the listener. The inversion of seats is due to the 
first: the psychotic with the object in his pocket can only 
cause the division of the other. In regards to the second 
one, the answer, Lacan locates at least two alternatives: to 
respond by fear and defend themselves from the encounter 
by constructing protective barriers (the walls of the asylum 
or of the theory) or respond with “something else” in front 
of that anguish that the encounter produces. 
The first alternative is on the side of the psychia-
trist’s position: to take mad people as object of studies. 
The second is the psychoanalyzed alternative. Lacan was 
expecting progress based on the fact that a psychoanalyzed 
would truly take care of a madman. A psychoanalyzed 
individual is someone who can respond with “something 
else” more than the anguish that the encounter with 
the psychotic produces. Someone who does not close 
the division with knowledge of the theory or with the 
barriers of asylums. Someone who can take things beyond 
anguish. A psychoanalyzed who recovers the dimension 
of the encounter without falling into the position of the 
psychiatrist, who defends himself from anguish with the 
theory. 
But then, what is the offer of the psychoanalyzed, 
what does he have to give different than the psychiatrist? 
That which not even the most beautiful bride in the world 
could offer: a warned desire that cannot wish the impossible 
(Lacan, 1986). The analyst’s response is at the level of his 
act and the desire that inhabits him. It is the specificity 
of his position that is the key to the analyst’s response 
(Lacan, 1991/2001), which is also in the encounter with the 
psychotic subject.
The analyst’s position excludes the answer by fear, 
anguish, admiration, fascination or objectification. The 
analyst has something else to offer, he supports the desire 
in his presence, becoming the cause of the analysand’s 
desire and it is in this fact that Lacan places the efficacy of 
analytic discourse. 
I conclude then that there could be a sort of 
“elective attraction,” of affinity between the psychotic and 
the analyst. I take the expression of the chemical metaphor 
that Goethe uses in Elective Affinities: two chemical 
substances that were inextricably bonded can be separated 
with the introduction of a third, dissipate substance and 
can recompose themselves and create a new combination. 
It is as if the initial attraction could be broken from the 
appearance of a new “related” substance. It is as if a kind 
of “elective affinity” were operating, as if there were 
a preferential choice. A new meeting can produce the 
separation and formation of a new body, to this place the 
encounter with the analyst could come. The key is in the 
answer and not in the supposed gravity of the psychotic 
position. 
This would explain why many psychotics ask for 
an analysis and stay in it for years, sometimes despite the 
resistance of analysts.
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Considerações para um retorno ao conceito de desejo na clínica analítica de psicoses
Resumo: O artigo tem a finalidade de discutir a relativa ausência de referências ao conceito de desejo psicótico dentro da 
comunidade lacaniana. O debate é relevante porque Lacan não excluiu o desejo nem a psicose de sua concepção do tratamento 
analítico. A pesquisa leva referências ao desejo psicótico na obra de Lacan e sua aplicação clínica (caso Schreber). A conclusão 
é que o problema não é a falta de desejo, mas seu apoio. O artigo propõe formas diferenciais de desejo psicótico associado a 
posições subjetivas cuja delimitação é importante para a cura.
Palavras-chave: desejo, cura, psicoses, psicanálise.
Considérations pour un retour au concept du désir dans la clinique analytique des psychoses
Résumé: L’article vise à discuter la relative absence de références à la notion de désir psychotique au sein de la communauté 
lacanienne. Le débat est pertinent parce que Lacan n’a pas exclu le désir ni la psychose de sa conception du traitement 
analytique. Le travail prend les références au désir psychotique dans l’œuvre de Lacan et son application clinique (cas Schreber). 
On conclue que le problème n’est pas le manque du désir, sinon comment le supporter. On propose des formes différentielles 
du désir psychotique associé à une dynamique des positions subjectives, dont la portée est importante pour la cure.
Mots-clés: désir, cure, psychoses, psychanalyse.
Consideraciones para un retorno al concepto de deseo en la clínica analítica de las psicosis
Resumen: El artículo propone discutir la relativa ausencia de referencias al concepto de deseo psicótico dentro de la comunidad 
lacaniana. El debate es de relevancia ya que Lacan no excluyó al deseo y tampoco a las psicosis de su concepción de la cura 
analítica. El trabajo toma las referencias al deseo psicótico en la obra de Lacan y su aplicación clínica (caso Schreber). Se concluye 
que el problema no es la ausencia de deseo sino su soporte. Proponemos formas diferenciales del deseo psicótico asociadas a 
una dinámica de las posiciones subjetivas, cuya delimitación es importante para la cura.
Palabras clave: deseo, cura, psicosis, psicoanálisis. 
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